political difficulties which he encountered when the church enforced the provisions of Vergentis, for the lawyers who wrote before the Fourth Lateran did not object to the rigorous punishment of defenders or receivers of heretics, and the early canonists showed little inclination to ameliorate the provisions of Vergentis. Of the canonists who touched on the problem, Johannes Galensis (c. 1210) noted that one could, in law, often be punished for the crime of another and implied that Vergentis was not too harsh.5 Laurentius Hispanus (c. 1210) proposed that a relative who protected a heretic should be punished as severely as others who were not bound by ties of blood. Roman law supported the notion that a relative who harbored or abetted a criminal should receive a lesser sentence, but Laurentius concluded that a distinction between relatives and non-relatives should not be made in the case of heresy.6 Although subsequent papal legislation was not affected by canonistic opinion, when Raymond de Pennafort placed Vergentis in the Decretals of Gregory IX, he made a slight change in the wording of the text which brought the decree into congruence with Excommunicamus.7
The other major provision of Vergentis stipulated that the orthodox sons of heretics be left destitute and prevented from inheriting any part of their father's estate. Since Innocent considered heresy as a treason against God, there is some logic to his conclusion that the penalties for heresy should be the same as those for treason in Roman law. Roman law had not equated treason and heresy. In Roman law, the sons of a heretic could inherit part of their father's possessions, and if the heretic had no sons, the orthodox relatives became the legitimate heirs.8 However, traitors to the emperor suffered complete confiscation of their goods. The first canonist to comment on Vergentis was Alanus (c. 1206) who wrote a gloss to the decretal for his own collection. He included the decretal, he said, as much for the language of the decree as for the decision itself, because (quoting Horace, Ars poetica, 343) he who mixes the useful with the sweet receives praise.10 Innocent's regal language impressed Alanus, and perhaps the pope had a hand in drafting Vergentis for the images in the letter are similar to those found in his sermons."l Shortly after Alanus, Johannes Galensis (c. The question still remained whether the sons of heretics should be disinherited. Marinus observed that according to the ius commune, a son should not be punished for the sins of his father, but the sons of heretics were an exception to this rule because the crime of the fathers was so "monstrous." The lawyers, he said, put forward two reasons for breaking with the ius commune: the stringent penalty would make fathers hesitate to jeopardize their sons, or the sons, being intimate with their fathers, would have known of their fathers' crimes and would be tinged with guilt. In either case, the punishment was appropriate. Quoting Exodus 20:5, Marinus noted that divine eloquence demanded punishment of God's "enemy and the children, to the third and fourth genera- Johannes recognized that there could be no difference between those lands subjected to the emperor and those owing allegiance to the church.53 Calderinus' argument was more attractive and convinced a small number of lawyers, but a typical reaction was that of Antonius Ricciulus. He thought the sons who were born before their fathers' heresy would be adults when their fathers were condemned, and their poverty and disgrace would be greater punishment for the heretic than that of an infant.54 However, these questions were merely peripheral in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, for the lawyers had established a firm consensus which adhered to the strict rigor of the law. The problem which the lawyers confronted with regularity was moral rather than legal. The inquisition had been functioning for several centuries, and the inquisitors who meted out sentences must have faced, again and again, the brutal reality of condemning innocent children to a life of poverty. For some, the problem was not serious. Paolo Grillardo bristled when he faced the argument that the orthodox sons of heretics should receive at least a portion of what was due them by natural law. On the contrary, they should not inherit one denarius, he wrote, but should suffer always and be ever in dire need: life should be pain and death solace.55 Diego de Simancas concurred and turned the maxim of Roman law on its head, saying: "horum benignius affectus laudandus quidem est, expedit tamen Reipublicae, ut filii quoque haereticorum egestate laborent" (cf. Dig.
16.3.31).56
Other lawyers thought that inquisitors should provide for the innocent children of heretics and not leave them entirely destitute. In Spain, the custom had been established that inquisitors should care for the children of heretics not out of any legal duty, but from mercy. Francisco Pena wrote in his commentary to Nicholas Eymeric's Directorium inquisitorum that inquisitors should provide for small children by appointing honest matrons of the city to raise and instruct them in the faith. Older children, who were either too young or too weak to work, should be given a small amount from their fathers' possessions so they 53 might live. Pefia said that the inquisitors should urge those princes who confiscated the property of the condemned to exercise liberality with the children.57 Some lawyers tried to establish the legal right for such aid, but the communis opinio upheld the principle that the children had no right, but received help only ex misericordia.58 By the seventeenth century, common practice dictated that sons and daughters who had not reached the age of puberty be given sustenance, but that daughters should also receive a dowry. Antonius Ricciullus thought that this distinction was equitable because of the imbecility of females; they needed more protection than males because of the weakness of their sex. The dowry, however, should not be large.59
At this late date, the inquisition had already become a hollow vessel which no longer exercised its former terror in Christendom. The lawyers still involved themselves with the legal problems which this "peculiar institution" of the Middle Ages created, and the literature on heresy which was written in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries is copious. But as we have seen, the lawyers of the later period approached the inquisition and its laws quite differently from their predecessors. While the early lawyers felt that they could subvert the repugnant provisions of the law through reason, using cleverly constructed parallel arguments from Roman and canon law to undermine the intent of Vergentis, in the late medieval and early modern world, lawyers were not so willing to compromise the intent of the legislator. They could only recall Hostiensis' suggestion that the punishments for heresy could be ameliorated ex misericordia, applying the balm of mercy to the unrelenting rigor of the law. , 1568) , vol. 5, p. 459, stated that five lawyers thought that the orthodox sons of heretics had a legal right to aid. However, he concurred with Pefia that they had no right, but agreed that they could be ministered to ex misericordia. 59. Tractatus de iure personarum, p. 509. "Nec mirum quod aequitas restringatur ad dotes filiarum et alimenta filiorum impuberum, quia habita est ratio imbecellitatis sexus et etatis.... Quantitas autem dotis in hac specie non potest praetendi pro naturalium dignitate, sed simpliciter mediocrem." They did not, however, have a right to a dowry or support.
